Authors

Chantal B. F. Vogels, Yale School of Public Health
Mallery I. Breban, Yale School of Public Health
Isabel M. Ott, Yale School of Public Health
Tara Alpert, Yale School of Public Health
Mary E. Petrone, Yale School of Public Health
Anne E. Watkins, Yale School of Public Health
Chaney C. Kalinich, Yale School of Public Health
Rebecca Earnest, Yale School of Public Health
Jessica E. Rothman, Yale School of Public Health
Jaqueline Goes de Jesus, Universidade de Sao Paulo
Ingra Morales Claro, Universidade de Sao Paulo
Giulia Magalhães Ferreira, Universidade de Sao Paulo
Myuki A. E. Crispim, Fundação Hospitalar de Hematologia e Hemoterapia do Amazonas
Brazil-UK CADDE Genomic Network
Lavanya Singh, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Houriiyah Tegally, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Ugochukwu J. Anyaneji, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Network for Genomic Surveillance in South Africa
Emma B. Hodcroft, University of Berne
Christopher E. Mason, Tempus Labs
Gaurav Khullar, Tempus Labs
Jessica Metti, Tempus Labs
Joel T. Dudley, Tempus Labs
Matthew J. MacKay, Tempus Labs
Megan Nash, Tempus Labs
Jianhui Wang, Yale University School of Medicine
Chen Liu, Yale University School of Medicine
Pei Hui, Yale University School of Medicine
Steven Murphy, Murphy Medical Associates
Caleb Neal, Murphy Medical Associates
Eva Laszlo, Murphy Medical Associates
Marie L. Landry, Yale School of Medicine
Anthony Muyombwe, Connecticut State Department of Public Health
Randy Downing, Connecticut State Department of Public Health
Jafar Razeq, Connecticut State Department of Public Health
Tulio de Oliveira, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Nuno R. Faria, Universidade de Sao Paulo
Ester C. Sabino, Universidade de Sao Paulo
Richard A. Neher, University of Basel
Joseph R. Fauver, University of Nebraska Medical CenterFollow
Nathan D. Grubaugh, Yale School of Public Health

Document Type

Article

Journal Title

PLoS Biology

Publication Date

2021

Volume

19

Abstract

With the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants that may increase transmissibility and/or cause escape from immune responses, there is an urgent need for the targeted surveillance of circulating lineages. It was found that the B.1.1.7 (also 501Y.V1) variant, first detected in the United Kingdom, could be serendipitously detected by the Thermo Fisher TaqPath COVID-19 PCR assay because a key deletion in these viruses, spike Δ69-70, would cause a "spike gene target failure" (SGTF) result. However, a SGTF result is not definitive for B.1.1.7, and this assay cannot detect other variants of concern (VOC) that lack spike Δ69-70, such as B.1.351 (also 501Y.V2), detected in South Africa, and P.1 (also 501Y.V3), recently detected in Brazil. We identified a deletion in the ORF1a gene (ORF1a Δ3675-3677) in all 3 variants, which has not yet been widely detected in other SARS-CoV-2 lineages. Using ORF1a Δ3675-3677 as the primary target and spike Δ69-70 to differentiate, we designed and validated an open-source PCR assay to detect SARS-CoV-2 VOC. Our assay can be rapidly deployed in laboratories around the world to enhance surveillance for the local emergence and spread of B.1.1.7, B.1.351, and P.1.

ISSN

1545-7885

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Included in

Epidemiology Commons

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